From the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant: Arab Tribes and the Syrian War-Juniper Publishers
Archaeology & Anthropology- Juniper Publishers
Introduction
In 1916, a young liaison officer, Lieutenant T.E.
Lawrence of the British Army travelled to Jeddah located in today’s
Saudi Arabia, in the midst of the First World War to meet with Faysal,
the third son of the Sharif of the holy Islamic city of Mecca, Husayn
Ibn Ali. In that meeting, the wick of an Arab revolt was lit that would
transform the entire region. That young officer would later be known
internationally as ‘Lawrence of Arabia’.The Arabs of the region launched
an armed insurrection against the Ottoman Empire, driven by the British
promises of an independent pan-Arab state in what has come to be known
as the McMahon Commitment[1].These promises were never intended to be
kept as Great Britain and France secretly negotiated the Sykes-Picot
Agreement that would define the territorial ambitions of both powers in
the Middle East after the Ottomans were defeated[2], turning the
agreement signed with the Arabs into a dead letter. This episode of
history left us with two notes that would shape and characterize the
future of the entire region from the Great War until the present: the
constant interference of foreign powers and the strategic importance of
tribal communities. This article will explore one of the least studied
aspects of the Syrian War, the Arab tribes and their positions in the
war, taking into account that the tribal formations that account for
approximately 60 and 70% of the total population of Syria[3].
Historical Perspective
In March 2007 22 member states of the Arab League ratified
the “Arab Peace Initiative” which in a previous incarnation, it was
called the “Saudi Peace Initiative”. The main thrust of the initiative
was to end the ArabIsraeli
conflict and normalize relations, on
condition that Israel withdraw to the borders of 4 June 1967. A
Palestinian State would be proclaimed with its capital in East
Jerusalem, and a just solution would be found for the Palestinian
refugees in accordance with U.N. Resolution 194. The Arabic
version of the initiative echoes alAnfāl
8, 61: “The Council [of
the Arab League] asks Israel to reexamine
her policy and incline
towards peace by proclaiming likewise a just peace as her strategic
objective”.
Ilai Alon, in an article that focuses on the language of the
peace initiative, explains that the phrase “incline towards peace”
plays an important role in Islamic political theory, underpinning a
wide range of international agreements and laws of war in Islam,
and famous among Muslims. It is reasonable to assume that its
usage here by the Arab League serves not only to invite Israel to
parley for peace, but also to uphold the principle maṣlaḥa, the
Muslim interest. The upshot is that the Arab League initiative
can nevertheless be viewed as their response to Israel’s prior
inclination towards peace - which, as Muslims, they are obliged
to accept, while remaining wary of possible treachery (alAnfāl
8, 62). This echo of alAnfāl
8, 61 is unremarkable since it has become
something of a “Peace Verse” in the popular consciousness, and
has been amply cited in justification of past peace treaties with
Israel, and also as proof that Islam is a religion of peace and
religious tolerance.
Moshe Sharon is convinced, therefore, that Islam’s conception
of peace is quite different from the Jewish or Christian one. The
Jewish and Christian conception stems from the Bible prophecies,
where peace is rendered in absolute, eschatological terms: the
utter end of bloodshed and unqualified goodwill among men. The
Quran does not evince any such reality. When Israel signed the
Camp David Accords with Egypt, Sharon points out, Carter wanted
to exalt the moment by quoting appropriate verses from the holy
books of the three Abrahamic faiths. As a Christian familiar with
the Bible, he had little trouble homing in on Micah and Isaiah to
find such gems as: “They will beat their swords into plowshares
and their spears into running hooks. Nation will not take up sword
against nation, nor will they train for war anymore” (Isaiah 2:4).
But when the American President charged his aides to locate a
likewise quotable Quranic passage, they were at a loss to find
the same kind of universally absolute and morally authoritative
message. What they did come up with was none other than alAnfāl
8, 61. Sharon concludes that Islam is a militant and aggressive
religion, and as such knows only one thing - victory. The Muslim,
he writes, is first and foremost a soldier in the army of Allah.
The Encyclopedia of the Quran under “Peace” asserts that
peace plays a pivotal role in the Quran and in the life of Muslims;
However the term itself mostly appears in conjunction with holy
war, i.e. Jihad, and so it must be perceived. This is true of alAnfāl
8, 61 as well. Surat alAnfāl
descended just after the Battle of Badr
between Muhammad and the idolaters of Mecca in 624 A.D. The
“Peace Verse” (61) clearly appears in the context of war, as verse
60 immediately prior exhorts Muslims to “prepare against them
whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which
you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy [traditionally
understood to mean idolaters] and others besides them whom
you do not know [but] whom Allah knows [according to one
interpretation, the Jewish tribe of Qurayẓa [10].
Quranic exegetes have made much of the warlike context
surrounding verse 61. For instance, contemporary scholar
Muhammad Mutawalli alSha
ʿrāwi (d. 1998), once Egyptian
Minister of Endowments (19761978),
asserts that verse 61
follows the “Preparatory Verse” (al‘
iʿdād), for Allah wishes to press
on the believers that the force they are amassing is not a means of
tyranny (tughyān) or war for its own sake. War preparations do
not require battle to bear them out, for if the enemy sues for silm
then must the Muslims acquiesce [11]. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi
(d. 2010), Sheikh of alAzhar
from 1996 till his death, writes in
his commentary on the Quran that the Prophet Muhammad was
obliged to fight the infidels who were in breach of their agreement
with the Muslims, and to prepare to this end a terrifying force
(verse 60). However, if those very same infidels were to incline (in
the language of verse 61: janaḥū) towards a truce (Tantawi takes
silm in this verse to mean musālama wamuṣālaḥa),
then must the
Muslims acquiesce, so long as their interest (maṣlaḥa) is being
served [12].
Contemporary Muslim scholarship holds up alAnfāl
8, 61 as
proof that MuslimInfidel
relations are founded on peace, with the
odd conflagration breaking out only when dictated by unfortunate
necessity (ḍarūra) [13]. However, detractors are quick to assert
that this opinion stands in blatant contradiction of Sharia law,
specifically the obligation in Surat alBaqara
2, 216 to engage in
Jihad (“Fighting has been enjoined upon you… etc.”). Verse 61,
they say, means only that Muslims may lay off fighting by means
of a hudna (musālama), on condition that it is truly necessary to
them (hujja); and this condition is elucidated in Surat Muhammad
47, 35, which enjoins Muslims: “So do not weaken and call for
peace while you are superior.” It is significant that alAnfāl
8, 61
serves as the fundamental justification of peace with Israel, cited
by contemporary Muslim scholars who are in favour. It is therefore
important to shed light on its various and multifarious shades of
meaning. The verse raises a number of noteworthy exegetical
concerns, on both the classical and contemporary levels.
a. What does the word silm mean exactly (it lends itself
to multiple readings among different commentators and
interpreters of the Quran)?
b. There is a conditional aspect apparent in the verse. On
whom does it depend?
c. Is the verse in question abrogated (mansūkh)? And if so,
which verse or verses specifically abrogate (nāsikh) it?
d. What does the conditional “’in janahū lilsilm”
mean
exactly? Let’s address these questions one by one.
The meaning of silm
The Bedouins historically refer to tribal groups and
Arab farming communities that descend from tribes of the Arabian
Peninsula[4], just to the south of the Levant where Syria is located in
the Middle East. The name Bedouin is the Arabic meaning for “dweller of
the desert”. It can be transliterated as bedaui, badawi, bedu, or
badiya, which literally means desert[5].These deserts, and the wider
arid regions of Syria, account for around 80% of the country’s
territory[6].Specifically, the tribes in Syria live in three large
geographical areas: al-Badia (desert/steppe), al-Jazira (the island,
east of the Euphrates) and Hauran (southwest)[7].
At the beginning of the 18thcentury, there was an
important migration of tribal groups from today’s Saudi Arabia towards
today’s Syria and Iraq. Reasons for this migration were either the fear
of some kind of plague or the rise of the warring Wahhabi
movement[8].This migratory stream was composed of two great tribal
confederations: Shammar and Aneza. Most of the Shammar tribe crossed the
Euphrates to the northwest of Syria and Iraq, but a minority remains in
the Arabian Peninsula[9].The Aneza community was established in the
“Badiya” of Syria. This confederation includes tribes such as the
Hassana, Ruwalla, Ageidat, Fedaan and Sbaa [10].Many of these tribes
retain important ties with the Arabian Peninsula, including the Saudi
royal family who are descended from the Hassana tribe and has blood ties
with other tribes such as the Ruwalla [11].In any case, the migratory
movement of these two great tribal confederations that were dedicated
mainly to the camel herding, provoked the first schism between the
tribes. Little by little they forced other tribes towards Syria’s
trading centres. Under Ottoman rule, they
became powerful and independent tribes. They were proclaimed
as noble tribes (asil)[12].Other tribes whose main activity was
sheep farming moved to the periphery of the major cities and
paid taxes to the Ottoman authorities who defined them as
non-asil or common tribes[13].Examples of the latter are the
Haddiyin and Mawali tribes in Syria.
The organization and functioning of the tribal communities
of Syria began to be strongly influenced by a central authority
in Aleppo and Damascus from the time of the Ottoman Empire,
as it began to be administratively established in eastern Syria
within the reformist framework of the Tanzimat [14].The
Ottoman strategy was to subdue or attract tribes through
political and economic reforms. Some tribes began to pay taxes
to the Ottoman governors established in large cities such as
Aleppo or Damascus, in exchange for benefits such as their
sons being exempt from military service[15].At that time, the
Ottomans began to buy the loyalty of some tribal leaders thus
encouraging a competition to obtain the ‘favours’ of the central
authority, something that has continued in Syrian history. Under
the French Mandate (1920-1946), the colonial power expanded
its authority and control. Initially, they took measures to prevent
incursions by the nomadic tribes in the colonised areas of
western Syria[16].Despite these initiatives, some tribes took
part in the Syrian nationalist revolts of 1925-27[17].Beginning
in 1930, the French attempted both to completely reorganize the
structure of tribal societies and to win the support of the tribes
to defuse the nationalist upsurge[18] The French authorities
began to pay subsidies to tribal leaders, assign grazing and
land ownership rights to some tribes, prohibit tribesmen from
carrying arms in colonised areas and demanded the payment of
taxes by the tribes[19].
At the same time, nine seats in parliament were assigned
to the members of certain powerful tribes[20].These measures
undermined the tribal leader’s authority and increased the
power and security of the state. Tribal leaders were consulted on
self-defence which was dependent on continuing state subsidies
to the tribes. These changes made tribal leaders less dependent
on the obedience of their communities to maintain their power,
through their new capacity to dispense patronage within the
tribes. An example of these changes is the case of migrations in
the 1930s of the Hassana tribe, located near Homs. This tribe
was a member of the important Aneza confederation, which
was linked through its blood ties to the Royal House of Al-Saud
in Saudi Arabia[21].The transformations within these tribal
societies, caused the extended family units of the migrating
Hassana tribe (beits) to become independent of the traditional
tribal authorities and finding greater security within the
apparatus of the colonial state.During the French Mandate, some
tribal leaders grew immensely rich through the colonial state’s
increasing intervention. The French authorities registered the
landowners throughout Greater Syria. In this registration of
landowners, many tribesmen and peasants were able to avoid
the taxes by their relationship to the major landowners. One
example of this arrangement was the registration of more than
20 villages by the Sheikh of Al Hassan Trad al-Milhem[22].
With the departure of the French from Syria after its
negotiated independence in 1946, these arrangements were
abolished, leaving tribal leaders as functional intermediaries
between the new independent state and their communities.
The new nationalist government attempted to reduce tribal
influence of the Bedouins which did not adopt loyalty to both the
nation-state and individual families. In 1956, the government
repealed the Tribal Law that had granted legal status to nomadic
tribes, including the right to bear arms[23].During the period
of the union between Syria and Egypt in 1958 under Nasser’s
leadership and the subsequent government of the Ba’ath
party between 1963 and 1970, there was a strong state drive
to eradicate tribal societies and their leaders. Nasser carried
out this policy by favouring the oppressed members of the
tribal communities through the redistribution of lands and the
promotion of these tribal members to political posts through
their membership in the Ba’ath party, to the detriment of
traditional tribal authority. In addition, the traditional herding
system (hima) and tribal customary law (urf) were abolished.
Similarly, the nine tribal seats of the parliament were reduced
to six, of which four were reserved for specific tribes. Two seats
corresponding to the province of Aleppo were allotted to the
sheikhs of the Mawali and Haddiyin tribes, one to the leader of
the Shammar confederation in the Jazira region and another for
the Hassana tribe in the Damascus region[24].
The Tribes in Ba’athist Era
The rigor by which the Ba’athist authorities treated the tribes
was tempered by Hafez Assad when he became president in 1970.
Assad tried to integrate the tribes into the new political system.
Under Assad’s presidency the Ba’ath Party restored a measure
of autonomy to tribal leaders by granting them some informal
authority over their communities and provided them with seats
in parliament. Positions within the state’s administration and
security forces allocated to important tribal leaders. The purpose
of these manoeuvres was to nullify the numerical advantage in
favour of the Sunni community regarding the religious affinities
existing within the tribes. However, as the tribal leaders a began
to abandon their communities in exchange for a discreet and
quiet life in Damascus or Aleppo, their traditional authority
eroded and their ability to mobilize tribal networks weakened.
Unofficially, the powers granted to these tribal leaders
were even greater since, while the police were in charge of
the surveillance of minor crimes, in the case of serious crimes
such as murder or rape, it was left to the authority of tribal
and clan leaders as a matter of their communities. This was
exemplified in the popular saying from Raqqa in Syria’s north:
“Offer loyalty and do what you want” (Itiwalaawa-ifal ma tashaa)
[25].The government did not hesitate to use some tribes in
an instrumental way to meet their interests, for example, the mobilisation of tribal forces to stop the armed uprising by the
Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982[26].Another example
was in 1973 when the state authorities displaced thousands of
members of the Busha’ban tribe, who were evicted from their
homes in al-Raqqa governorate because of the construction of a
dam on the Euphrates River. The ulterior motive for this forced
tribal removal was to establish an ‘Arab Belt’ in the Kurdishmajority
regions of Syria after the latter had mass migrated to
the country decades earlier from other Ottoman provinces that
are located in today’s Turkey[27].
After his ascendency to the presidency, Bashar al-Assad,
the son of Hafez, the relations between the state and the tribes
followed a similar pattern. The new president issued an executive
order to privatise all state farms, allowing tribal leaders who had
lost large estates under the redistribution laws of the 1960s to
recover them and even increase their holdings[28].A series of
clientelist networks were established which enriched the tribal
leaders but did not benefit the other members of the networks.
The privileges and economic benefits granted by the state to
the tribal leaders demanded in return the obedience of the
communities under their control, this was Syria’s form of what
could be called the ‘tribal contract’, as opposed to the ‘social
contract’ formulated by Rousseau in the eighteenth century[29].
Despite this arrangement the Bedouin population of Al-Badia
because of its reliance on agriculture and livestock, was hit hard
by unemployment. This tribe suffered from the consequences of
a great drought which produced the total collapse of the rural
economy in eastern and southern Syria.
Tribal Organization
The Arab tribes of Syria are divided into qabilas (national
and transnational tribal confederations) and `ashiras (individual
tribes). The ‘ashiras are further subdivided into fukhud (clans),
khums or ibn `amm (lineages), and at their lowest echelon, at
al-bayt or aa’ila (extended families). The ‘ashiras are normally
present in a specific region of the country, such as the ‘ashiras al-
Haddadine in northwest Aleppo and Idlib; al-Muwali in Idlib and
al-Damaakhla in Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Raqqa; Bani Khalid in
west-central Homs and Hama; and, al-Zoubi in Dara’a and along
the border with Jordan[30].The tribal organization is built on the
basis of the concept of patriarchal traditional family, historically
forming semi-autonomous groups of people united by blood
ties that herded animals within their respective territories.
The distinctive feature of each clan is a shared common male
ancestor, which brings together different groups or branches
with respect to a common male relative even more distant. Each
tribal group, from the smallest to the largest confederation,
usually share the name of the common ancestor that supposedly
founded the particular group[31].The tribal community itself is
defined in terms of kinship. Its patterns of behaviour, both within
and between groups is governed by kinship relationships[32].
The kinship system also served to modulate the relationships
between different clans and clan groups. The individual stands at
the centre of an ever-widening circles of kinship relations that,
at least in theory, is linked to all the other members of a tribe in
a particular region of the country. The status of the individual
within a clan is determined from birth according to their kinship
relationship with the rest of the members of the group.
Another feature of tribal communities because of the cohesion
of religious and ethnic groups is inbreeding, or the marriage of
members within their group. Lineages, or groups of families
that trace offspring to a common ancestor, are also conditioned
by inbreeding, although this is in fact less common, despite its
theoretical desirability. Seen as a practical link between families,
marriage often has political and economic connotations even
among the poorest members of tribal communities.The tribal
family group and the individual home are based on blood
ties between men. The typical tribal home is formed by three
generations living together under the same roof: the elderly
couple, their married children, daughters-in-law and sonsin-
law and, finally, grandchildren and single granddaughters
as well as other patrilineal relatives. This pattern responds to
what we call extended family. Upon the death of the head of the
family, adult children establish their own separate homes. It is
normal for marriages to occur within the lineage and it is not
uncommon for the child of the father’s brother, the first cousin,
to be the person designated for the marriage. This practice is
commonplace among Sunni Arab, Kurds and Turkmen and
occurs in within rural social classes but is rarer in large cities.
The system of election for the members of the tribes
remains invariable and is governed by traditional norms such
as patriarchy in spite of the different transformations and
social changes that have occurred throughout history. Within
a tribe, only one specific family lineage generates its leader
or “sheik” (sheikh). This family lineage ‘beit al-mashaykha’
or ‘beit alashira’ has an important status in the community.
Any member of this lineage, including the sheikh’s brothers,
sons, male cousins, and nephews, can theoretically access the
tribe’s leadership after the death of the sheikh (as determined
by consensus among tribal community/tribal council or majlis
leaders), although, in practice, the first-born son usually takes
over[33].No power or authority outside of the tribe, not even the
state, can appoint a tribal leader. However, growing economic
hardship has significantly affected the youngest members of
the tribal communities. Increasing pressure exerted by the
government authorities, have modified matters related to tribal
authority. The traditional vertical authority of the Sheikh within
the tribes has weakened over the decades. Tribal authority has
been transformed by a system of collective decision-making by
larger and more complex tribal networks surpassing the singular
authority of a sheikh or their family.
Tribalism and the Conflict in Syria
The members of the tribes, united by bloodlines, have the
duty to defend the members of the tribe attacked by members
of other – tribes, or by individuals outside the tribal system.This behaviour responds to the concept of ‘intiqaam’, which
means revenge for real or perceived offenses committed against
a relative[34].At the dawn of the uprisings in Syria in 2011, a
whole series of networks were formed by young members of
tribes, disaffected with the authorities, who lived in the cities
but shared a common tribal identity.There are well-documented
events of malaise that existed in the moments before the revolt
as the manifestation of the “Day of Wrath” that took place in cities
across Syria, including in with on February 5, 2011 where there
was an important tribal presence, especially from the Jabbour,
Ta’iyOuinaza confederation[35].One of the first acts of this
uprising was the popular reaction to alleged torture suffered by
several members of the al-Zoubi tribe in Dara’a by government
agents. The incident caused outrage and was the catalyst for
uprisings in the cities of Deir Ezzor, Homs and Aleppo, where
the impulse of solidarity and self-defence was determined by the
tribal customary laws (‘urf)[36].The death of the child, Hamza
Ali al-Khateeb, of the al-Zoubi tribe in April 2011 in Dara’a,
became one of the main symbols of the ascribed ‘Revolution’ in
Syria[37].A leading oppositionist in the region was Bashar al-
Zoubi (Abu Fadi), commander-in-chief of the Southern Front and
leader of the Yarmouk Brigade, who was a notable and wealthy
member of the al-Zoubi community[38].
The main tribes of this region are, the al-Zoubi, the al-Hariri,
al-Na’ime and al-Rifa’i. Many members of these tribes swelled
the ranks of different opposition militant groups and battalions
operating in the area. All were supposedly responding to
customary law.The tribal sheikhs attempted to exert significant
pressure to stop these protests in an attempt to preserve their
status. Their action provoked a series of squabbles between
and within tribes, clans and family lineages, dividing them into
Assad loyalists or opponents. Subsequently, the dynamics of the
conflict has subjected the tribes to enormous pressure to choose
sides.It must be stressed that the Revolt in Syria, unlike events in
Tunisia and Egypt that were driven by the urban protests, began
in rural areas and the outskirts of large cities. In Syria the social
upsurge was a protest from the periphery against the centre. In
this sense, tribalism has played a key role in the spread of protest
throughout the country, by its very nature and dispersion. Once
the generalised violence was unleashed, some tribal groups
armed themselves as a measure of self-defence. Both sides in the
war, government and armed opposition, have mobilized their
resources to attract these groups to their areas of control and
use them politically and militarily in the struggle.
For example, the Bani Khalid and al-Muwali tribes have been
active fighters in the armed opposition and exemplify the role of
a local ashira within the conflict that has taken place in western
Syria[39].Some battalions of the Bani Khalid tribe, fighting
under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) participated
in the battle of Homs and its suburbs. Another example of this
response is the Shield Brigade of the same tribe in Hama[40].
Similarly, members of the Al-Muwali tribe fought against
the Syrian Army near Ma’ratNuman, south of the city of Idlib,
where the presence of this tribe is significant[41].There are
three battalions in the opposition forces of western Syria that
proclaim their tribal origin, without referring to a specific tribe.
One of these groups is the “Battalion of the Free Tribes”, which
is also active inMa’ratNuman[42].This battalion operates under
the umbrella of the armed Sunni opposition group, Ahfaad al-
Rasul, (Descendants of the Prophet). Another tribal battalion
was created in Dara’a. They were, formed in February 2013
by army deserters with tribal origins from several provinces,
calling themselves the “Free Tribes of al-Sham”. This battalion
was integrated into the “al-Omari” brigades, affiliated with
the group “AlwiyaAhfaad al-Rasul” in Dara’a. It must also be
mentioned that the “Front of the Syrian Tribes” was formed in
Aleppo in April 2013[43].
Some large transnational tribal confederations such as
Ougaidat, Baggara and Shammar. played a role in organising
armed militia. Members of the Qabila al-Na’im is one of the largest
tribal confederations in Syria formed a brigade in the Damascus
countryside. The Qabila Ougaidat confederation became one of
the most active in the fight against Assad, forming the Ougaidat
Tribal Brigades, who became widespread throughout Syria[44].
This confederation was crucial in organising the exiled group,
the Council of Arab Tribes of Syria. Some members of the
Ougaidat confederation and prominent Assad opponents are
Shayk Nawaf al-Faris, former ambassador to Iraq, Colonel Abdul
Jabbar al-Okaidi, an important military leader in Aleppo until
his resignation, and the former head of the Political Security
Division of Latakia, General Nabil al-Fahad al-Dundal[45].
Many of the great tribes of the northeast and east of Syria such
as Shammar, Baggara, Jabbour, Dulaim and Ougaidat maintain
close and strong ties with their counterparts in Saudi Arabia and
Iraq[46].Their tribal relationship has been a determining factor
in the internationalisation of the conflict through the entry of
weapons and equipment from Saudi Arabia through the existing
transnational tribal networks.
Loyalties Found
There are cases of wills found within the same tribal
confederation, whose members are torn between support for
Assad or the opposition. This is an outcome of the character
and local reach of these tribal groups and their lack of cohesion
and dispersal throughout Syrian territory. In addition, tribal
loyalties changed or were contested after the years of clientelist
politics applied by the central government, which undermined
the traditional tribal model and, in a certain way, the authority of
its leaders. We can even speak of changing wills according to the
course of the war. This occurred to the Baggara confederation,
many of whose members have converted to Shi’a Islam[47].In
the area of Aleppo, numerous members of this tribe have fought
in the ranks of the Syrian Army. In contrast, one of its most
prominent leaders in Deir Ezzor, Shayk Nawaf Raghib al-Bashir
fled to Turkey to join the Council of Arab Tribes and to lead
the Jazirah and Euphrates Front to Liberate Syria[48].After the
military defeat of the opposition in Aleppo in December 2016, al-Bashir returned to Damascus and pledged allegiance to Assad
and the Syrian Army, in an endeavour to play a leading role in his
hometown of Deir Ezzor in the post-conflict period[49].
Shayk al-Bashir had also organised armed groups to fight
against the Kurds in the ethnically diverse city of Ras al-`’Ayn in
Hasakah province[50].These types of actions highlight another
of the great problems of the Syrian chessboard, such as the Arab-
Kurdish antagonism and their fragile coexistence in the region,
caused by the historical frictions between both ethnic groups
that occur mainly in the areas of Hasakah and Qamishli. Another
example of this confusion of tribal loyalties is how members of
the Ta’ie tribe organised in the pro-Assad Popular Committees
(later Syrian National Defence Forces) under the orders of the
member of parliament, Sheikh Muhammad Fares. They were
reported to be involved in fighting in the Qamishli area, against
Kurdish fighters of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Despite
the official denial in any involvement in this fighting by the latter,
the tension between the two communities remains.The Ta’ie
or Tayy tribe, which can be found in both Syria and Iraq found
its origins in Yemen, although it could also be before Arabised
Arameans after their forced conversion to Islam[51].During
the Christian genocide of 1915 perpetrated by the Ottomans,
the Yazidi military leader of Sinjar HammoSarro along with his
friend Mohammad Sheik, leader of the Tayy tribe, gave shelter to
numerous Armenians, Arameans and other Christians who fled
the massacre.
Another example can be found in the Haddiyin tribe, where
tribal militias were formed either supporting or opposing the
Assad government depending upon whether their creator was
a traditional leader (generally, government supporters) or
a younger member. Within this tribe, some members fought
alongside opposition groups in the vicinity of Aleppo[52].
Others, however, remained loyal to the Syrian government as
part of a militia run by the Defence Minister Fahad Jasem al-Frej,
who is of the Hadidiyin tribe, near Idlib. This militia collaborated
in supplying food to the besieged government forces in Aleppo.
After occupying the areas where this militia fought in Idlib,
the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra captured Sheikh Nayef
al-Saleh of the Hadidiyin tribe and beheaded him in public for
assisting the Syrian military[53].In particular, he was accused
of smuggling food to the fences at Abu Duhur military airport
to government troops that was besieged. There are members of
the Baggara tribe fighting on the side of the Syrian government
against the opposition in Aleppo, while other tribal members are
aligned with anti-government forces in Deir Ezzor[54].
Finally, the powerful Shammar confederation, dominant in
the Hasakah region, through its leader Shaik Hamidi Daham al-
Hadi, has been involved in the conflict by sending a few thousand
fighters to the Sahadid Forces. They are led by the Shaik’s son,
Bandar al-Humayi. These combined forces are integrated into
the Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
fighting against ISIS in eastern Syria[55].This conglomerate of
opposition groups has a strong Kurdish presence in its ranks and
receives military aid and support from foreign powers, principally,
the United States[56].However, they also bring together fighters
of Arab origin to allay simmering Kurdish-Arab antagonisms
and appease the villagers while strategically occupying more
territories to the south. This militia of the Shammar tribe has
important connections with the Gulf monarchies[57]. The Qabila
Shammar groups have many sub-tribes such as the Abdah,
Aslam and Zoba[58].It is estimated that its population amounts
to 3 and a half million in the eastern region of Syria. It maintains
important connections with tribal groups in the provinces of Al-
Anbar and the area surrounding Mosul of Iraq, who are trained
and armed by Western powers[59].
Crucially, the Syrian government reacted from the first
moment of conflict by attempting to ally with the greater
number of sheikhs and members of tribes. Assad sponsored a
series of conferences under the name of “Syrian and Arab Tribes
Forum”[60], emphasising their role as the first line of resistance
to foreign intervention in the war. In the surrounds of Hasakah,
members of the Ta’i and Jabbour tribes fight in the ranks of
the government because of the precarious situation of these
communities under mounting pressure from Kurdish groups.
In general, the oldest sheikhs and the traditional leaders have
been more cautious about supporting the revolt, which has led
to an important generational fracture in the tribal networks.The
Bedouin tribes remain powerful disunited forces in the current
conflict in Syria, especially in geographical areas where the
presence of the state has been weak or absent. It is in localities
where local and foreign actors of the conflict have tried to
influence the tribes or win them to their cause, within the sights
set on the framework that is generated after the war.
Tribes and the Rise of ISIS
The rise of ISIS and its struggles with Jabhat al-Nusra in
eastern Syria at the end of 2014 had dramatic consequences
producing a major inter-tribal fracture in many clans. The clans
of the Egidate tribe were driven into allegiances with Jabhat
al-Nusra or ISIS[61].The background of the clashes was whose
forces would seize and control the important oil fields in Deir
Ezzor province after the withdrawal of the Syrian Army. Members
of the Al-Bakir clan were aligned with ISIS while members of the
al-Bukamel and Sheitha clans fought with Jabhat al-Nusra in
their battles against ISIS[62].This internecine warfare ended in
the complete defeat of al-Nusra and its allies who were isolated
from their populations. Or, in some cases, massacred which
happened with the crucifixion of more than 700 members of the
Sheitat tribe in southern Deir Ezzor province and in the cities
of Abu Hamam, Al-Kashkiyah and Ghranij[63]. Members of the
Sheitat tribe were organized into a tribal militia called Ussud al-
Sharqiya (Eastern Lions) formed by a few hundred combatants
under the command of Tlass al-Salam (Abu Faisal)[64].After
their rout by the Syrian Army, clan members either fled to
Kurdish-held territory, to join the ranks of the pro-government
side in Homs province, or a minority even swore allegiance to
ISIS.
Fearful of the prospect of the creation of an autonomous
Kurdish enclave in Syria, Turkey engaged in tribal politics by
promoting the establishment the “Army of the Eastern Tribes”,
a grouping of the heads of 45 clans in the Deir Ezzor, Hasakah
and Raqqa provinces[65].This Turkish move intended to take
advantage of the old Arab-Kurd rivalry to counteract the growing
influence of the PYD in the traditional territories of the Arab
tribes and nullify the territorial threat posed by the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) and its related organizations like the
People’s Protection Units (YPG).ISIS has also activated tribal
rivalries by releasing videos of tribal leaders, including Baggara,
Egidate, Jabbour and Bu Sha’an swearing allegiance to its
Caliphate[66].The terrorist organisation attempted to generate
support by playing on the divisions caused by the sociological
changes within the tribal structures, to attract a new generation
of ambitious leaders who reject traditional structures, by
offering them benefits from oil smuggling. This may explain the
behaviour of one of the former senior officials responsible for
the security of the Caliphate in Raqqa, Abu Abd Al-Rahman Al-
Amni, better known as Ali al-Sahou, who recruited young people
from his “Bu Sha’ban” tribe, as well as others for ISIS[67].
Finally, the role Jordan has played on the southern frontier
of the war must be considered. Amman promoted the formation
of tribal militias to counteract the influence exerted by ISIS and
Jabhat al-Nusra in the region. A Jordanian initiative led to the
creation of the “Army of the Free Tribes” composed of combatants
of different clans[68].Most of its fighters are members of the
Nu’im tribe, who have ancestral ties with countries such as Qatar
and Bahrain, although members of the al-Hariri, al-Masalmah,
al-Zoubi and Fadl tribes also became armed by Jordan[69].In the
same region, the US-backed militia JayshMaghawir al-Thawra
or the New Syrian Army, an important tribal composition, also
suffered major military setbacks in the city of Abu Kamal. Another
prominent tribal militia group is Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, formed
by members of the al-Mashhura, Albu Assaf, AlbuKhamees, Jais,
AlbuShamis, AlbuJarad, Albu Issa tribes in Raqqa province[70].
Conclusion
Tribalism is an important factor which must be taken into
account in the dynamics of the current conflict in Syria. To
date, it is a question yet to be been given any major scholarly
consideration or scrutiny. However, it is important to understand
its development and the scenario that may exist when the conflict
ends, especially when considering all the actors involved, both
internal and external. The US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey have all attempted to instrumentalise the tribes in order
to use their networks, manpower and influences. What has come
to be called the Syrian Revolution within the series of revolts
since the Arab Spring began was totally unlike the previous urban
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. In Syria it became ‘a revolution
of the periphery’, of the rural world, where tribal communities
have played a central but never a decisive role.The development
of the Syrian conflict has followed a pattern of action already
known and developed in other parts of the world. Jihadist
groups like Al-Qaeda attempt to find sanctuaries in border
regions, usually inhabited by tribal members, such as Waziristan
in Pakistan, Shabwa in Yemen, Al-Anbar in Iraq or, in the case at
hand, the steppes of Syria.These are regions where the power
and authority of a centralised state authority has little or no
presence and can operate with relative ease, against militarised
tribal forces deploying insurgency and guerrilla tactics.
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